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MILITARY

Trump Trans Military Ban Keeps Catching Flak
Three new federal rulings largely side with plaintiffs seeking to block policy
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD

T

wo federal district judges and a US magistrate
judge have issued new
rulings — largely adverse to the government — in lawsuits challenging the Trump administration’s policy to ban military
service by transgender individuals.
After the San Francisco-based
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to lift Seattle District Judge
Marsha Pechman’s preliminary injunction against the policy on July
18, she issued a new ruling on July
27 granting the plaintiffs’ motion to
compel discovery and denying the
government’s motion for a protective order that would shield President Donald Trump from having to
respond to any discovery requests.
The Justice Department immediately announced it would appeal
this ruling to the Ninth Circuit.
Pechman had previously denied
motions for summary judgment in
the case, having found that there
was a need for discovery before such
a ruling could take place.
On August 6, DC District Court
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, who
had issued the first preliminary injunction against the policy last year,
issued two decisions. In one, she rejected the government’s request to
vacate her preliminary injunction
against Trump’s plan announced
last summer as moot since Defense
Secretary James Mattis, in February, sent the president a memo
outlining a “new” policy. Kollar-Kotelly agreed with Pechman that the
“new” policy is not essentially different from the “old” one Trump had
articulated.
Kollar-Kotelly did, however, grant
the government’s motion to dismiss
Trump as an individual named defendant in the case.
And, on August 14, Magistrate
Judge A. David Copperthite, to
whom Baltimore District Judge
Marvin J. Garbis had referred discovery matters in Stone v. Trump,
another one of the pending cases,
issued a ruling granting in part
the plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery of deliberative materials in
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President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary James Mattis.

Trump and Mattis’ development of
the new policy the administration is
seeking to implement.
Garbis has other motions to rule
on in the case in Baltimore, and
another suit challenging the proposed transgender ban is pending
in federal district court in Riverside,
California, where the judge is considering motions similar to those
filed with Judges Pechman, KollarKotelly, and Garbis.
To recap for those coming late
to this story, Trump tweeted a ban
on transgender military service on
July 26, 2017, and issued a memorandum a month later describing
the policy in slightly more detail,
tasking Secretary Mattis to propose a plan for implementation by
late February 2018, with the goal of
implementing the policy by March.
Trump’s memo specified that
Mattis’ previous directive to allow
transgender applicants to join the
military effective January 1, 2018,
was to be indefinitely delayed, since
the president’s policy would not allow transgender people to enlist.
When Trump issued his memo, Mattis announced that no action would
be taken against current transgender personnel pending implementation of a new policy, but there were
reports of trans service members
seeing promotions and desired assignments canceled, as were some
planned medical procedures.
Mattis’ memo to the president in
February proposed some modifications to the policy Trump put forward last August. Trans person-

nel who were already serving and
had transitioned and were “stable”
in their preferred gender would be
allowed to continue serving, based
on a determination that the investment in their training outweighed
whatever “risk” they posed to military readiness. Trans individuals
who had not transitioned or been
diagnosed with “gender dysphoria”
would be allowed to enlist and serve,
provided they refrained from transitioning and served in the gender
identified at birth. Otherwise, those
diagnosed with “gender dysphoria”
would be prohibited from enlisting
or serving, and those who could not
comply would be discharged.
The Mattis proposal was based on
a “finding” — from a rigged special
committee dominated by committed opponents of transgender service — that allowing trans people to
serve in the military is harmful to
the operational efficiency of the service. This conclusion was based on
no factual evidence and oblivious
to the fact that transgender people
had been serving openly without
any problems since the Obama administration lifted the prior ban at
the end of June 2016. It also flew
in the face of Pentagon conclusions
that were the basis of the Obama
policy change.
Four lawsuits had been filed
in response to the summer 2017
policy announcement, and in a
matter of months the four district
courts had issued preliminary injunctions, having found it likely the
plaintiffs would prevail on their ar-

gument that the policy violates the
Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection requirements. Given these injunctions, the Defense Department
allowed trans people to submit applications to enlist beginning on
January 1 of this year, after losing
a last-ditch court battle to continue the enlistment ban. There have
been reports, however, that the applications received are getting very
slow processing, and all indications
are that few have been accepted for
service.
Trump responded to Mattis’ February 2018 memo by “withdrawing”
his prior memo and tweet and authorizing Mattis to adopt the implementation plan he recommended.
The Justice Department then filed
motions in all the lawsuits seeking
to lift the preliminary injunctions.
Their argument was, in part, that
the “new” policy was sufficiently
different from the one that had
been “withdrawn” as to moot the
lawsuits. They further contended
that the plaintiffs who were already
serving and would be allowed to
continue serving under the “new”
policy no longer had standing to
challenge the policy in court. And
Justice argued that the plaintiffs’
attempts to conduct discovery in
the case should be put on hold until
there was a definitive appellate ruling on the government’s motion to
lift the preliminary injunctions.
On April 13, Judge Pechman rejected the government’s motion to
lift the preliminary injunction, having already ordered that discovery
proceed. In his initial tweet, Trump
claimed he had consulted with
generals and other experts before
adopting the policy, but the identities of these people were not revealed and the government — making generalized claims of executive
privilege — has stonewalled any
attempt to discover their identities
or any internal executive branch
documents that might have been
generated on this issue.
Similarly, the February memorandum released under Mattis’
name did not identify any individu-
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als responsible for its development,
and naturally the plaintiffs are
also seeking to discover who was
involved in putting it together and
what information they purported to
rely upon.
Pechman’s July 27 order to compel discovery specified the materials sought by the plaintiffs, and
pointed out that under evidentiary
rules any claim of executive privilege against disclosure is subject to
evaluation by the court.
“The deliberative privilege is not
absolute,” she wrote. “Several courts
have recognized that the privilege
does not apply in cases involving
claims of governmental misconduct
or where the government’s intent is
at issue.”
Under Ninth Circuit precedents
governing Pechman’s decisionmaking, the question is whether
plaintiffs’ need for the materials
and for accurate fact-finding overrides the government’s interest in
non-disclosure. Factors involved in
making that determination include
the relevance of the evidence, the
availability of other evidence, the
government’s role in the litigation,
and the risk that disclosure would
hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated
policies and decisions. In invoking privilege, the government must
“provide precise and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of designated material.”
Pechman had previously determined that discrimination because of gender identity involves
a “suspect classification” regarding the Constitution’s requirement
of equal protection, which means
the government has the burden of
proving that there is a compelling
justification for the discrimination.
Here, however, the government has
articulated only a generalized judgment that service by transgender
individuals is too “risky” based on
no facts whatsoever. Pechman concluded in granting the plaintiffs’
discovery motion that “the deliberative process privilege does not apply
in this case.”
The government had moved for a
protective order “precluding discovery directed at President Trump.”
Even though the government conceded that Trump has “not provided
substantive responses or produced
a privilege log” listing specifically
GayCityNews.nyc | August 16 – August 29, 2018

what information has to be protected against disclosure, the Justice
Department contended that “because the requested discovery raises ‘separation of powers concerns,’”
the plaintiffs must “exhaust discovery ‘from sources other than the
President and his immediate White
House advisors and staff’ before he
is required to formally invoke the
privilege.”
Pechman noted that so far the
government has refused to provide
any information about how the
policy decision was made and has
failed to identify the specific documents and other information for
which it claims privilege. In a footnote, she commented, “The Court
notes that Defendants have steadfastly refused to identify even one
general or military official President
Trump consulted before announcing the ban.” As a result, she found,
there was no basis for her to evaluate “whether the privilege applies
and if so, whether Plaintiffs have
established a showing of need sufficient to overcome it.”
Indeed, in a prior decision, Pechman concluded as far as the record
stands, it looks as if Trump made
the whole thing up himself without
relying on any military expertise.
From that perspective, she has preliminarily rejected the government’s
contention the policy is owed the
deference normally extended to military policies adopted based on the
specialized training and expertise
of Pentagon policy-makers.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s August
6 ruling focused on an issue that
Pechman had previously decided:
whether the plaintiffs had standing
to continue challenging the policy
after Mattis’ memo supplanted
the “withdrawn” earlier policy announcements. She had little trouble
determining that all the plaintiffs
— even those currently serving who
would be allowed to continue serving under the “new” policy — still
had standing, which requires a
finding that implementing the policy would cause them harm.
“The Court rejects Defendants’
argument that Plaintiffs no longer
have standing because they are not
harmed by the Mattis Implementation Plan,” Kollar-Kotelly wrote,
stating that “the effect of that plan
would be that individuals who require or have undergone gender
transition would be absolutely disqualified from military service, indi-

viduals with a history or diagnosis
of gender dysphoria would be largely
disqualified from military service,
and, to the extent that there are any
individuals who identify as ‘transgender’ but do not fall under the
first two categories, they would be
allowed to serve, but only ‘in their
biological sex’ (which means that
openly transgender persons would
generally not be allowed to serve in
conformance with their identity).”
In addition, those who have transitioned and are now serving would
be doing so under the stigma of being labeled as “unfit” for military
service and presenting an undue
risk to military readiness, and
would likely suffer prejudice regarding assignments and their treatment by fellow service members, as
well as emotional harm.
“The Mattis Implementation Plan
sends a blatantly stigmatizing message to all members of the military hierarchy that has a unique
and damaging effect on a narrow
and identifiable set of individuals,
of which Plaintiffs are members,”
Kollar-Kotelly wrote. They would be
serving “pursuant to an exception to
a policy that explicitly marks them
as unfit for service. No other service
members are so afflicted. These
Plaintiffs are denied equal treatment because they will be the only
service members who are allowed to
serve only based on a technicality;
as an exception to a policy that generally paints them as unfit.”
She pointed out that beyond stigmatization, the Mattis plan “creates
a substantial risk that Plaintiffs
will suffer concrete harms to their
careers in the near future. There is
a substantial risk that the plan will
harm Plaintiffs’ career development
in the form of reduced opportunities
for assignments, promotion, training, and deployment. These harms
are an additional basis for Plaintiffs’
standing.”
Kollar-Kotelly rejected the government’s contention that these harms
were only “speculative.”
Agreeing with Judge Pechman,
she rejected the claim that Trump’s
“withdrawal” of his August 2017
memorandum and the substitution
of the Mattis plan made the existing lawsuits moot, finding that the
“new” plan was merely a method of
“implementing” the previously announced policy. The Mattis plan,
like the policy Trump announced
last August, “prevents service by

transgender individuals,” and the
minor deviations from the complete
categorical ban were not significant
enough to make it substantially different, Kollar-Kotelly concluded.
Kollar-Kotelly did, however, grant
the government’s motion to partially dissolve the injunction as it
applies personally to Trump, and
granted the motion to “dismiss the
President himself as a party to this
case.” Should the plaintiffs prevail
on the merits, an injunction aimed
at the Defense Department’s leadership preventing the policy from
taking effect will provide complete
relief, she pointed out.
The plaintiffs had complained
that removing Trump from the
case as a defendant would undermine their attempt to discover the
information necessary to make
their case, but the judge wrote that
“it would not be appropriate to retain the President as a party to this
case simply because it will be more
complicated to seek discovery from
him if he is dismissed. To the extent that there exists relevant and
appropriate discovery related to the
President, Plaintiffs will still be able
to obtain that discovery despite the
President not being a party to the
case.”
In the Baltimore case, Magistrate
Judge Copperthite this week issued
a ruling granting in part the plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery of
deliberative materials regarding
Trump’s July 2017 tweet, his August 2017 memorandum, the “activities of the DoD’s so-called panel
of experts and its working groups”
who put together the memorandum
ultimately submitted by Mattis to
the president in February, and deliberative materials regarding that
Implementation Plan and the president’s subsequent March memorandum, “including any participation or interference in that process
by anti-transgender activists and
lobbyists.”
Copperthite, noting that a motion is pending before Judge Garbis
to dismiss Trump as a defendant
in the case, declined to rule on the
government’s request for a protective order that would shield the
president from having to respond
to discovery requests directed to
him, “pending the resolution of the
motion” before Garbis. Cooperthite
wrote that “no interrogatories or
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document requests will be directed to President Trump as a party,
but may be directed to other parties pursuant to this Memorandum
Opinion. If the Motion to Dismiss
is denied, the Court will revisit the
issue of the protective order as to
President Trump.”
Cooperthite faced a practical dilemma in dealing with the government’s requests to shield Trump
from discovery.
“On July 27, 2017, President
Trump tweeted transgender persons would no longer be able to
serve in the military and as for any
deliberative process, simply stated
this policy occurred after consulting with ‘my Generals and military
experts,’” he wrote. “There is no evidence to support the concept that
‘my Generals and military experts’
would have the information Plaintiffs request. There is no evidence
provided to this Court that ‘my
Generals and military experts’ are
identified, in fact do exist, or that
they would be included in document
requests and interrogatories propounded to the Executive Branch,
excluding the President. By tweeting his decisions to the world, the
President has, in fact, narrowed the
focus of Plaintiffs’ inquiries to the
President himself. The Presidential
tweets put the President front and
enter as the potential discriminating official.”
Cooperthite, here, is raising the
real question as to whether discovery that doesn’t include Trump is at
all meaningful, since the ultimate
legal question in the litigation is the
intent of the government in adopting the ban which is, at bottom,
the president’s intent. On the other
hand, discovery directed at Trump
raises serious questions about
separation of powers and the traditional respect for the confidentiality
of internal White House policy deliberations, as Kollar-Kotelly noted
in her ruling.
“So many factors are unknown
at this juncture in the litigation,”
wrote Copperthite. “It is unknown
whether Plaintiffs can obtain the
information necessary from the
non-Presidential discovery to define
the ‘intent’ of the government with
respect to the transgender ban.
Defendants offer as an alternative,
a stay of discovery with respect to
the President, until the Motion to
GayCityNews.nyc | August 16 – August 29, 2018

Dismiss the President as a party
is decided. If the President, as the
discriminating official, tweeted his
transgender ban sua sponte as alleged, this Court sees no alternative to obtaining the intent of the
government other than denying
the protective order with respect to
President Trump.”
However, he wrote, precedents
“instruct this Court to give deference to the executive branch because ‘occasions for constitutional
confrontation between the two
branches should be avoided whenever possible.’”
So Copperthite decided to put
off deciding the protective order
issue until after Judge Garbis decides whether to dismiss Trump as
a party, but for now will order the
defendants only to comply with discovery requests directed to defendants other than Trump, Secretary
Mattis, and the secretaries of the
individual military branches.
The possibility that Trump will
be ordered to submit to questioning
under oath in at least one of these
cases remains a reality, but any
attempt by the plaintiffs to do so
would undoubtedly arouse spirited
opposition from the Defense Department, officially based on claims of
privilege, but realistically due to the
likelihood that Trump would perjure himself under such questioning. Recall the historical precedent:
The House of Representatives voted
to impeach President Bill Clinton
based, in part, on the charge that
he committed perjury during questioning before a grand jury by the
special counsel investigating his affair with Monica Lewinski. At least
in that case, the House considered
presidential perjury to be an impeachable offense.
Plaintiffs in the Seattle case,
Karnoski v. Trump, in which the
president remains a defendant, are
represented by Lambda Legal and
pro bono attorneys from Kirkland &
Ellis. Plaintiffs in the DC case, Jane
Doe 2 v. Trump, are represented
by the National Center for Lesbian
Rights, GLBTQ Legal Advocates &
Defenders (GLAD), and pro bono attorneys from Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP and Foley Hoag
LLP. Plaintiffs in the Baltimore case,
Stone v. Trump, are represented by
the American Civil Liberties Union,
the ACLU of Maryland, and pro
bono attorneys from Covington &
Burling LLP.
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